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COMMENT
Suspending Employers' Immigration-Related Duties
During Labor Disputes: A Statutory Proposal
Immigration and labor law can be uncomfortable bedfellows. The
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 19861 requires employers on
pain of sanctions to check employees' work papers, such as Social Security
cards and work permits, and to have new hires fill out forms.2 At the same
time, labor and employment laws give workers the right to be free from
intimidation and retaliation while engaging in protected activities, such as
organizing unions and protesting unsafe working conditions. This Comment
addresses situations in which an employer's doubt - sincere or not - about the
validity of an employee's papers arises during a labor dispute.' Adhering to
immigration duties might require the employer to verify work authorization
even if doing so chilled workplace rights enforcement; protecting labor rights
could bar verification efforts during a labor dispute. The law is unclear about
1. Pub. L. No. 99-603, loo Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
(2000)). IRCA amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, Pub. L. No.
82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000)).
2. All citizens, nationals, and noncitizens must fill out a Form 1-9. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2000);
8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1) (2005); see also U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Form I-
9, Employment Eligibility Verification, http://uscis.gov/graphics/formsfee/forms/i-9.htm
(last visited Apr. 9, 20o6).
3. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §5 151-169 (2000)), provides rights to private-sector employees
seeking to form, join, or assist labor organizations. The Act defines a labor dispute as a
dispute "concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." 29 U.S.C. § 152(9). In this
Comment, "labor dispute" refers to those activities as well as other workplace activities
protected under federal and state labor, employment, health, occupational safety, and
antidiscrimination laws.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2193
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
whether immigration duties or labor rights should prevail. This confusion
undermines shared national and state policy goals for both workplace
protection and immigration control.4 While the agencies implementing those
goals have found much common ground,' the specific issue of whether
employers should check workers' documents during labor disputes has slipped
through the cracks.
This uncertainty hurts the parties involved on the ground: employers,
employees, agencies, and courts. Employers who comply dutifully with
immigration and labor laws are at a competitive disadvantage compared to
noncompliant employers who use document verification after the time of hire
as a trump card over employees who voice grievances.6 Documented workers
suffer from lowered wages and workplace standards because they do not report
unlawful employer behavior, fearing that employers will replace them with
undocumented workers, especially in industries with heavy immigrant worker
concentrations.7 Undocumented workers are harmed because they do not
4. See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.s. 137, 155 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the lower cost of noncompliance "increases the employer's incentive
to find and to hire illegal-alien employees"); EEOC v. First Wireless Group, Inc., 225 F.R1D.
404, 407 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ("'[E]mployers have a perverse incentive to ignore immigration
laws at the time of hiring but insist upon their enforcement when their employees
complain.'" (quoting Rivera v. Nibco, 364 F.3 d 1057, 1072 (9 th Cir. 2004))).
s. For example, employers cannot contact immigration agencies in order to retaliate against
workers for protected activities. See, e.g., In re Herrera-Priego (Immigr. Ct. July 1O, 2003)
(on file with author) (terminating deportation hearings based on Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) operating rules for how to question persons during labor
disputes); see also Singh v. Juda, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (resolving a Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) dispute); Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, and the Employment
Standards Division, Department of Labor (Nov. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Memorandum of
Understanding], reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 227, at E-lo (Nov. 25, 1998); Orrin
Baird, Undocumented Workers and the NLRA: Hoffman Plastic Compounds and Beyond, 19
LAB. LAW. 153, 161 & nn.54-55 (2003) (listing relevant NLRB cases); Michael J. Wishnie,
Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497, 516-21 (2004). But
see Montero v. INS, 124 F,3d 381, 385 n.4 (2d Cir. 1997) (interpreting the INS operating
instructions in a different manner than Herrera-Priego did).
6. For example, the INS and Department of Labor (DOL) Memorandum of Understanding,
supra note S, notes the "business advantages that may be gained through the employment of
highly vulnerable and exploitable workers at sub-standard wages and working conditions,"
while labor law enforcement can "foster a level competitive playing field for employers who
seek to comply with the law." Id.
7. See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf & Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through Immigration Law:
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 145 (2002)
(describing effects on documented workers); see also JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR.,
SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.:
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enforce their statutory rights' or are fired unlawfully in retaliation for their
protected activity.9 Finally, courts and the relevant agencies face increased
enforcement problems; to fill the void they have had to patch together
agreements about their respective roles and to create imperfect motive-seeking
tests for identifying when employers' verification efforts are unlawful.
Congress is in the best position to address the document-verification
uncertainties." ° In Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, the Supreme Court
concluded that a different immigration-labor problem "must be 'addressed by
congressional action,' not the courts."" That invitation tees up the proposal
here: Congress should amend IRCA to provide a strong and clear rule
suspending employers' verification duties during labor disputes.
I. THE IRCA PROBLEM THROUGH THE LENS OF LABOR LAW
Congress enacted IRCA in 1986 primarily to "end[] the magnet that lures
[undocumented workers] to this country."12 IRCA establishes procedures for
verifying employees' work authorization, prohibits employers from knowingly
hiring or continuing to employ undocumented workers, and provides penalties
ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 12 tbl.i (2oo6),
available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf (ranking job categories with high
immigrant concentrations).
8. For a description of these rights, see, for example, Memorandum from the Office of the
Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to All Regional Dirs., Officers-in-Charge and Resident Officers,
Procedures and Remedies for Discriminatees Who May Be Undocumented Aliens After
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. (July 19, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter NLRB
GC-o2]. The EEOC and DOL have provided similar guidance. As of March 20o5, an
estimated 1i.1 million undocumented individuals lived in the United States; unauthorized
workers constituted 4.9% of the civilian labor force. PASSEL, supra note 7, at i-ii.
9. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1o65 (9th Cir. 2004) (observing that "most
undocumented workers are reluctant to report abusive or discriminatory employment
practices" because they fear retaliation); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right To
Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 676-79 (2003).
lo. As recent controversies attest, Congress also is deeply interested in immigration reform.
None of the proposed bills would alter substantially the proposal here.
11. 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002) (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 (1984)).
Hoffnan Plastic found that an undocumented worker who had violated IRCA, 8 U.S.C. §
1324c (2000), by using false documents to get a job could not claim back pay for an unlawful
discharge in retaliation for union activity. Most of the dozens of post-Hoffman Plastic
decisions have found that the decision does not affect other existing protections and
remedies for undocumented workers. E.g., Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, Nos. 11o868/oo &
590104/03, 2006 W 396944 (N.Y. Feb. 21, 2006). But see Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA,
313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
12. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 45 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5649-50.
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for violations. 3 Yet the text of IRCA does not address how these provisions
should interact with either federal or state labor laws. 4 IRCA also does not
state directly that employers are under a continuing duty to check work papers
later if they did not do so when hiring the worker or if they later suspect, but
are not sure, that a worker's documents are fraudulent."5 As described above,
this lack of clarity creates broad policy concerns and on-the-ground problems.
The following discussion focuses on the National Labor Relations Board's
(NLRB) 6 difficulties when considering claims brought under the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) alleging that employers retaliated against workers
engaged in protected activities by requesting their documents. The current
NLRB approach exhibits two main problems. First, judges are generally
uncertain about where IRCA ends and where labor law begins in the
document-verification context. Second, while the NLRB has established that
demands for work authorization and adverse actions based on documentation
problems can constitute unfair labor practices during labor disputes, there's a
hitch: Under the Wright Line causation test, the NLRB General Counsel must
prove that the employer took an action that it would not have taken if the
worker had not engaged in protected activities.' 7 Compliance with IRCA
provides employers with a strong, though rebuttable, defense. The following
four NLRB cases highlight these problems, beginning with the decision closest
in spirit to the proposal here.
13. 8 U.S.C. S 1324a(a), (b) (2000); see also National Employment Law Project & National
Immigration Law Center, Basic Information Brief: Reverification (2002),
http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymntllnfo-Memos/basic inforeverification.htm.
14. IRCA's legislative history suggests that Congress did not seek to erase existing protections.
E.g., H.R. REp. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662
(discussing the intent not to diminish labor protections). Compare Hoffman Plastic
Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 15o n.4 (2002), with id. at 155 (differing in how much
weight to grant to this history).
is. Courts have not resolved this question fully. Some statutory support exists for the idea that
employers are under a continuing duty to check workers' papers. See supra note 13. Some
case law support exists as well. "Constructive knowledge" of workers' undocumented status
in violation of IRCA can be imputed to employers when they have strong suspicions,
received warning information from immigration authorities, or completed forms improperly
or inadequately. This duty is analogous to the IRCA regulatory requirement, 8 C.F.R. 5
274 a.2(b)(vii) (2005), that employers update the forms when documents expire. See, e.g.,
New El Rey Sausage Co. v. INS, 925 F.2d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 1991); Big Bear Super Market
No. 3 v. INS, 913 F.2d 754, 757 (9 th Cir. 199o); Mester Mfg. Co. v. INS, 879 F.2d 561, 566-
67 (9th Cir. 1989); Zamora v. Elite Logistics, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1119 (D. Kan. 2004).
16. The NLRB handles alleged violations of the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. S 153 (2000).
17. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1o83 (198o), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981); see also Manno
Elec., Inc., 321 N.L.RtB. 278, 280 n.12 (1996) (summarizing the Wright Line doctrine).
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First, the recent North Hills Office Services, Inc. decision properly affirmed
that an employer's requests from union supporters for work papers and the
resulting discharges under the cover of compliance with IRCA were illegal' 8
The court concluded that the employer's "affirmative defense that it was acting
pursuant to its obligations under the federal immigration law [was]
laughable"19 and that "the only logical reason for this odd [document] request,
at this suspicious time, was to harass" workers because of their union
activities.2" The General Counsel therefore overcame the employer's Wright
Line defense.
The language in Regal Recycling, Inc., however, points to the hovering
uncertainty about IRCA verification requirements. In that case, the employer
had discharged employees during a labor organizing campaign after
"demanding a mass production of work authorization documents" based on
alleged IRCA compliance.2' The NLRB found that this employer failed the
Wright Line test. Nevertheless, the Board declared that "the Respondent's
attempt at strict compliance with eligibility requirements as to these employees
[was] arguably proper under immigration law."'
The third decision, Sara Lee, exhibits even more tentativeness about the
labor-immigration law boundary while revealing the problems arising from the
Wright Line test. After a successful union organizing campaign, the employer
terminated a long-term employee who had monitored elections and had
testified before the NLRB about unfair labor practices. 3 When charged with
unlawful termination, the employer argued on flimsy evidence that the worker
might have used doctored papers to get her job and therefore the employer had
"no choice but to terminate" 4 the worker or to let her resign because of this
suspicion. In uncertain language, the administrative law judge (ALJ) noted that
the employer
offers no authority for this broad assertion, and its legal validity may be
questionable. However, given the statutory and case authority
18. N. Hills Office Servs., Inc., Cases 29-CA-25715 et al., 2005 WL 1672856 (NLRB July 13,
2005); see also Michael's Painting, Inc., 337 N.L.R.B. 86o, 868 (2002); Victor's Cafe 52, Inc.,
321 N.L.R.B. 504, 514 (1996); Concrete Form Walls, Inc., Cases lo-CA-34483 et al., 2004
WL 2033015, at *8 (NLRB Div. of Judges Sept. 8, 2004).
ig. N. Hills Office Servs. at *30.
zo. Id. at *22.
21. Regal Recycling, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 355, 356 (1999).
22. Id.
23. Sara Lee, Cases 21-CA-36154 et al., 2005 WL 2129138 (NLRB Div. of Judges July 29, 2005).
24. Id. at *20.
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regarding an employer's burden of compliance under IRCA, I find it
was not unreasonable ...to conclude the company might risk civil
and/or criminal liability by retaining an employee who they believed
had deceptively obtained work authorization.5
The employer therefore survived the Wright Line test by having "suspended
and thereafter terminated [the employee] because of perceived inaccuracy in
her work permit. ",26
Finally, the Deffenbaugh Disposal Services, Inc. decision did not even struggle
with the IRCA-labor law boundary question. 7 The judge found no NLRA
violation when a dispatcher reviewed workers' documents before a union
election and made other alleged retaliatory threats about reporting the workers
to immigration authorities if they "did try to vote for the union. '' ,s The ALJ
declared that the dispatcher was just following the "IRCA require[ment] that
where a question arises about an employee's continued work authorization, an
employer again [must] review documents to determine that the employee has
maintained his authorization to work legally in this country."2 9 The judge did
not gesture at any potential timing problem or question the assertion that
IRCA required such action.
II. FREEZING EMPLOYERS' IRCA DUTIES DURING LABOR DISPUTES
Congress should amend IRCA to make clear that employers have no
responsibility, or right, to request work authorization in the middle of labor
disputes.3" An additional time buffer around the actual labor dispute could be
necessary to effectuate the goals of this amendment, a form of extended
reprieve from verification duties so that employers could not just wait until a
labor dispute ends to make the same retaliatory move.
25. Id. The ALJ noted that "[w]hether Respondent was required to act upon its suspicion that
(the complainant's] documentation. (which had passed INS muster) was premised on
inaccurate information is not so clear." Id. at 19. Concrete Form Walls, Inc., Cases io-CA-
34483 et al., 2004 WL 2033015, at *8 (NLRB Div. of Judges Sept. 8, 2004), set a much higher
evidentiary bar.
26. Sara Lee, 2005 WL 2129138, at *21.
27. Deffenbaugh Disposal Servs., Inc., Cases 17-CA-2262 5 et al., 2004 Va 1804090 (NLRB Div.
of Judges July 30, 2004).
28. Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted). The ALJ assumed "[f]or purposes of this
discussion" that the dispatcher had made those comments. Id. at *11 n.15.
29. Id. at *6.
30. If workers apply for jobs during labor disputes, employers must check the workers' papers.
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The amendment also would instruct immigration, labor, and employment
agencies not to engage in document-enforcement activities during labor
disputes. As a result, employers could ignore unwitting agency pressure to
respond to document problems, which can come from the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),"1 the Social Security
Administration,32 or a third-party service.33 Under this proposal, the intent
behind employers' requests for documents would not matter.
Clarifying employers' duties and rights would have a host of positive
effects. It would prevent retaliatory document requests that chill the
enforcement of workplace rights and contravene immigration policy: Workers
would face less of a race to the bottom. Employers could depend on a clear rule
and not worry about sanctions. Agencies could work together more smoothly
and fulfill their enforcement functions more effectively. In the NLRB context,
the amendment would remove both the existing uncertainty and the
employers' primary Wright Line defenses, making it clear that verification
actions during labor disputes were not "arguably proper."" These effects
would strengthen the enforcement goals of immigration law by doing exactly
what IRCA calls for: reducing the incentives for employers to hire
undocumented workers. The barriers facing low-wage workers, especially
immigrants, in the workplace and in courts are so high that any fears about
encouraging frivolous lawsuits or labor disputes are likely to remain
unsubstantiated. The proposal therefore would satisfy broader policy goals
while resolving practical problems.
III. AGENCY AND JUDICIAL ACTIONS TO SUPPLEMENT THE FREEZE
Enacting a statutory suspension of IRCA's verification requirements during
labor disputes would take time. Meanwhile, the problems described above will
continue. Even after enactment of a bar on verification efforts, violations would
31. ICE handles key functions of the former INS. ICE sends employers who violate IRCA a
notice of intent to fine. See United States v. Rupson of Hyde Park, Inc., No. 97Aooo15, 1997
WL 1051441, at *1 (Dep't of Justice June S, 1997); see also 8 C.F.R. § 27 4 a.9(b), (d) (2005).
32. The Social Security Administration notifies employers through so-called No-Match letters
that a problem exists with workers' Social Security numbers. See, e.g., PRITA LAL ET AL.,
SOCIAL SECURITY NO-MATCH INFORMATION AND EMPLOYER SANCTIONS: WHAT ADVOCATES
NED TO KNOW (2004), available at http://www.nelp.org/document.cfm?
documentID=57.
33. The services notify employers about Social Security number discrepancies. See Zamora v.
Elite Logistics, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1111 (D. Kan. 2004).
34. Regal Recycling, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 355, 356 (1999).
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occur. Therefore, immigration, labor, and employment agencies should bring
their internal policies in line with these recommendations. Courts also should
develop supportive doctrines, whether in cases brought under the NLRA, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or other laws. The following
recommendations focus on actions to support workers who bring claims
against employers. The effects of such actions, though, would spread broadly
throughout the workplace.
To begin with, workers need meaningful procedures at the merits stage of a
case alleging unlawful documentation requests. At a minimum, the NLRB
could remove Wright Line defenses from employers who did not check
workers' documents at the time of hire.3" The NLRB could develop a new
presumption of unlawfulness that employers must overcome based on the
timing of document requests. It could apply a Wright Line analysis to
complaints arising from adverse employer document requests during the
buffer-zone period suggested above. The NLRB, and other agencies and
courts, also could protect workers from discovery requests into or inquiries
about their immigration status.,
6
Yet workers, especially undocumented ones, who prevail at the merits stage
often lose in the long run because no real options are available at the remedies
stage.17 Therefore, prohibitions on inquiries into immigration status at this
stage, paralleling such bars in the liability phase, should be strengthened."8
Future-looking remedies, such as conditional reinstatement and conditional
back pay, should be awarded as appropriate. 9 The NLRB also should award
3S. In addressing a back pay question, the NLRB has stated that "[w] here an employer hires an
employee with knowledge that he is not legally entitled to work in the United States, it
cannot assert that it would have terminated the employee on the basis of his immigration
status." Met Food, 337 N.L.R.B. 109, 112 (2001) (citations omitted); see also Wishnie, supra
note 5, at 512 & n.82 (citing equitable estoppel principles in NLRA case law).
36. Such protection has been granted in cases brought under various laws. E.g., Rivera v.
NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057 (9 th Cir. 2004); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (FLSA); Topo v. Dhir, 21o F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Alien Tort Claims
Act); Tuv Taam Corp., 340 N.L.R.B. 756 (2003). But see Shahid Haque, Beyond Hoffman
Plastic: Reforming National Labor Relations Policy To Conform to the Immigration Reform and
Control Act, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1357, 1377-78 (2004) (arguing that the NLRB should ask
about workers' status during investigations).
37. See Christopher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for Protecting Undocumented Workers in the Title VII
Context and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 473, 528 (2005) (discussing bifurcation).
38. NLRB GC-o2, supra note 8.
39. See Tuv Taan Corp., 34o N.L.RB. at 759; County Window Cleaning Co., 328 N.L.RtB. 1go
(1999); see also NLRB GC-o2, supra note 8 (supporting a "conditional reinstatement order
against employers who flout both the [NLRA] and IRCA by hiring and firing known
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contempt sanctions, broad cease-and-desist orders, union access to workplaces,
and notices read to entire workforces.
40
CONCLUSION
This proposed amendment would not depart entirely from current law.
Rather, it would codify the principles underlying NLRB decisions such as
Regal Recycling and North Hills. It also would support current immigration
enforcement practices.4" IRCA and labor and employment law might be in
tension, but they are not incompatible or in direct conflict. This amendment
would be consistent with IRCA42 as well as with long-established workplace
standards, while providing firmer ground for all those who stand in the
uncertain territory between the two.
ANNIE DECKER
undocumented workers."). The NLRB should amend its policy guidelines that bar back pay
to undocumented workers even if they did not submit false documents at the time of hire.
NLRB GC-o2, supra note 8. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), did
not address this scenario.
40. See Smithfield v. UFCW Local 204, Cases 11-CA-15522 et al., 2000 WL 33666937, at *186-89
(NLRB Div. of Judges Dec. 15, 2000) (awarding such "extraordinary," or Fieldcrest Cannon,
remedies).
41. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Immigration authorities will suspend their
enforcement actions during labor disputes; therefore, it makes sense to relieve employers
temporarily of the paperwork obligation that leads to such enforcement.
42. For example, the amendment would complement IRCA's existing "good faith compliance"
exception for employers who make technical or procedural errors in their verification efforts.
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6)(A)-(B) (2ooo). The continuing-duty cases also are generally
compatible with an amendment. Most do not involve labor disputes, and most emphasize
employer "reasonableness" in complying with IRCA in order to avoid "unjust or capricious"
action. Mester Mfg. Co. v. INS, 879 F.2d 561, 567 ( 9th Cir. 1989).
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